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ABSTRACT 
The seemingly stable construct of our bodily self depends 
on the continued, successful integration of multisensory feedback 
about our body, rather than its purely physical composition. 
Accordingly, pathological disruption of such neural processing is 
linked to striking alterations of the bodily self, ranging from limb 
misidentification to disownership, and even the desire to amputate 
a healthy limb. While previous embodiment research has relied on 
experimental setups using supernumerary limbs in variants of the 
Rubber Hand Illusion, we here used Mixed Reality to directly 
manipulate the feeling of ownership for one’s own, biological limb. 
Using a Head-Mounted Display, participants received visual 
feedback about their own arm, from an embodied first-person 
perspective. In a series of three studies, in independent cohorts, we 
altered embodiment by providing visuotactile feedback that could 
be synchronous (control condition) or asynchronous (400ms delay, 
Real Hand Illusion). During the illusion, participants reported a 
significant decrease in ownership of their own limb, along with a 
lowered sense of agency. Supporting the right-parietal body 
network, we found an increased illusion strength for the left upper 
limb as well as a modulation of the feeling of ownership during 
anodal transcranial direct current stimulation. Extending previous 
research, these findings demonstrate that a controlled, visuotactile 
conflict about one’s own limb can be used to directly and 
systematically modulate ownership – without a proxy. This not 
only corroborates the malleability of body representation but 
questions its permanence. These findings warrant further 
exploration of combined VR and neuromodulation therapies for 
disorders of the bodily self.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The foundations of our “selves”, and our understanding of who we are, are 
laid by the continuous and successful integration of multisensory 
information about our body. This interdependence between “mind” and body 
has occupied the thoughts of scholars time and again: from Descartes’ notion 
that the self cannot exist without the senses (Descartes and Cottingham, 
2013), to Husserl positing that there is no possibility of distancing the self 
from the body or the body from the self (Husserl, 2002), to William James’ 
oft-cited claim that the body is “always there” (James, 1890). There is an 
overwhelming sense that the direct neural representation of our bodies, in 
harmony with our actual body composition, forms the basis of an infallible 
bodily self. However, clinical examples challenge this notion and have 
suggested that the body indeed can be experienced as lost, not under control, 
or not belonging (Brugger and Lenggenhager, 2014). This latter feeling of 
ownership is argued to be a key aspect of our sense of a bodily self (Blanke, 
2012). Yet, while psychological and neuroscientific research has extensively 
investigated the fundaments of the feeling of ownership for a foreign body 
part, the loss of ownership has largely been neglected.  
Empirical insights into corporeal awareness stem to a large extent from 
experimental designs, which allow temporarily altering the sense of 
ownership through multisensory stimulation (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; 
Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). 
Most famously, Botvinick and Cohen induced illusory ownership of an 
artificial hand by stroking a rubber hand placed in front of the participant in 
synchrony with the participant’s real hidden hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 
1998). This phenomenological experience of ownership over the rubber hand 
is accompanied by objectively-measurable changes in a broad variety of 
processes ranging from basic physiological mechanisms (e.g., body 
temperature (Macauda et al., 2015; Moseley et al., 2008), nociception 
(Hansel et al., 2011; Romano et al., 2014), cardiac signalling (Park et al., 
2016), neural or skin response to threat (Ehrsson et al., 2007), and 
immunological responses (Barnsley et al., 2011)) up to high-level cognition 
(see e.g. (Maister et al., 2015) for a recent review). These data thus suggest 
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that the bodily self is highly plastic and based upon momentary sensory 
integration.  
Next to advancing our understanding of the nature of bodily self-
consciousness and its disorders, such empirical evidence might contribute 
towards developing methods to restore the bodily self where it is disturbed 
(Moseley, 2007; Pazzaglia et al., 2016). Strikingly however, most studies 
using multisensory stimulation in healthy participants or patients targeted the 
manipulation to bodily ownership of an additional and external, fake or 
virtual body (part), someone else’s limb (Hohwy and Paton, 2010), or more 
recently, two virtual representations of one’s own limb (Newport and 
Preston, 2011; Ratcliffe and Newport, 2017). In the above-described rubber 
hand illusion (RHI), the most striking phenomenological perception is the 
feeling of ownership for the supernumerary rubber hand not the feeling of 
disownership for the real hand, which has generally been reported to be 
rather low (e.g. (Longo et al., 2008)). Furthermore, implicit measures of the 
illusion have shown to be predicted by the feeling of ownership for the 
rubber hand rather than by the feeling of disownership (Folegatti et al., 
2009). In fact the two sensations are generally difficult to disentangle due to 
the nature of the RHI’s experimental design (Longo et al., 2008), and thus 
call for direct experimental manipulation of disownership (Folegatti et al., 
2009).  
An experimental paradigm directly probing disownership is especially 
important from a clinical perspective. Body ownership disturbances after 
brain damage range from the feeling of one’s limb not being there 
(asomatognosia, cf. (Jenkinson et al., 2018)), to a sensation of disownership 
combined with feeling of hatred towards it (misoplegia, cf. (Loetscher et al., 
2006)) or attribution of ownership to another person (Bottini et al., 2002), to 
the pathological embodiment of another person’s hand (cf. E+ patients 
(Garbarini et al., 2015)). The latter is phenomenologically closest to what 
participants report during the RHI. However, these cases are quite rare 
(Fossataro et al., 2018), whereas the pure feeling of disownership 
(accordingly named E-) prevails after right hemispheric brain damage. This 
is also the case for various psychiatric conditions such as depersonalization 
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syndrome, in which the own biological body often does not feel like 
belonging to the “self” anymore (Sierra et al., 2005). Perhaps the purest 
sense of body disownership manifests in individuals suffering from 
xenomelia. These individuals feel like parts of their body do not belong to 
them (McGeoch et al., 2011) often resulting in extensive pretending 
behaviour (i.e. simulating their desired body state) and the desire for 
amputation (Brugger et al., 2013). Individuals with clinically altered body 
ownership for their biological body typically show enhanced illusory 
ownership in RHI-like setups (e.g. (Lenggenhager et al., 2015; Smit et al., 
2018; van Stralen et al., 2013)) which might suggest a stronger influence of  
online sensory information over longer term body representation. This 
further highlights the need for an experimental protocol to directly induce 
and measure disownership of the real body. Such paradigms are important to 
better understand and disentangle multisensory mechanisms underlying the 
broad range of clinically altered body ownership symptoms.  
We here describe a paradigm, the Real Hand Illusion (ReHI), designed to 
address this discrepancy between clinical reports and existing research 
paradigms in trying to alter the sense of ownership of one’s own biological 
limb in a Mixed Reality setup. During the illusion, participants view their 
own hand directly and from a first-person perspective through a head-
mounted display (HMD) being touched either synchronously or 
asynchronously to the visual feedback (see Figure 1). The paradigm extends 
the study by Gentile and colleagues (Gentile et al., 2013), as it allows 
participants to view and move their own hands in the virtual space in real-
time, eliminating the perception of viewing pre-recorded feedback. As the 
setup is fully automated possible confounds due to manual synchronization 
are precluded. The illusion was assessed, immediately after each condition, 
using a questionnaire adapted from the classical RHI questionnaire 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008). As synchronous 
visuotactile stimulation has repeatedly been shown to increase perceived 
ownership, we predicted continued ownership during synchronous 
stimulation and – more pertinent to the phenomenology described in clinical 
cases – decreased ownership of the own limb during asynchronous 
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stimulation (Gentile et al., 2013). The latter could thus be regarded as 
temporarily mimicking the phenomenology found in Somatoparaphrenia or 
Xenomelia patients, i.e. the feeling of estrangement for their own limb.  
Both Somatoparaphrenia and Xenomelia have been suggested to relate to 
alterations in multisensory bodily areas in the predominantly right-
hemispheric posterior parietal areas (Hilti et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 2011; 
Rode et al., 1992) as well as structural and functional hyper-connectivity 
within the sensorimotor system (Hänggi et al., 2017). As a consequence, 
both syndromes predominantly affect the left side of the body. In a second 
study, we thus investigated whether the feeling of disownership could be 
evoked more easily on the left as compared to the right hand in healthy 
participants. Based on previous literature on the rubber hand illusion which 
suggests stronger illusion for the left hand (Ocklenburg et al., 2011), we 
hypothesized a stronger sensation of disownership during asynchronous 
stroking of the left as compared to the right hand.  
In line with the idea of a right posterior parietal involvement in disorders of 
body ownership, we further investigated whether neuromodulation of these 
parietal areas might alter the illusion in a systematic way. Brain imaging 
studies in individuals with Xenomelia have reported altered neural processes 
in the superior and inferior parietal lobe (Hilti et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 
2011; Oddo-Sommerfeld et al., 2018) at least partly overlapping with the 
network described by Gentile and colleagues (2013). Limb misidentification 
due to right-hemispheric damage has also been associated with parietal areas 
(Antoniello and Gottesman, 2017; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). In line with 
this, neuromodulation through vestibular stimulation, which activates right 
parieto-insular areas (Lopez et al., 2012), has been shown to be helpful in 
Somatoparaphrenia (Rode et al., 1992) and consecutively also suggested as a 
therapeutic approach for Xenomelia ((Ramachandran and McGeoch, 2007); 
but see also (Lenggenhager et al., 2014)). Similarly, left anodal galvanic 
vestibular stimulation has been used to manipulate bodily ownership in 
healthy participants in a rubber hand illusion setup (Lopez et al., 2010). In a 
further, exploratory study, we used transcranial brain stimulation rather than 
indirect peripheral stimulation to alter activation of right parietal areas. We 
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applied anodal and cathodal tDCS over the right superior parietal lobe 
normalised by a baseline sham stimulation. In line with previous literature 
we expected stimulation of right parietal networks to modulate body 
ownership.  This hypothesis is further supported by two recent tDCS studies 
reporting a modulation of the drift measure of the RHI in case of anodal 
stimulation applied over the right temporo-parietal junction (and right pre-
motor cortex (Convento et al., 2018) and a change in the onset time of the 
illusion, but not drift, during anodal stimulation over right posterior parietal 
cortex (PPC) respectively (Lira et al., 2018). These studies further reported 
significant, if slightly different, effects of anodal tDCS on perceived body 
ownership. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1. Setup 
The technical setup follows the methods of our previous study (Bernal et al., 
2016) as described in the following. A MacBook Pro Retina by Apple 
(Apple Inc., Cupertino, CA, USA), was used to render the visual feedback. 
The laptop had a dedicated AMD Radeon R9 M370X graphics card. The 
Oculus Rift DK2 (Subsidiary of Facebook, Menlo Park, CA, USA), Version 
1.6 (SDK 0.5.0.1), was used to display the feedback. The HMD has a 
resolution of 960x1080pixels per eye, a horizontal field of view of 100°, and 
a refresh rate of 60Hz. Head orientation but not translation was tracked, as 
participants were asked to keep their head stationary during each trial. A 
LeapMotion controller (Leap Motion, Inc. San Francisco, CA, USA, 
Software Version 2.3.1) recorded the participant’s hand as well as the 
paintbrush, used to provide tactile feedback, using the integrated infra-red 
(IR) cameras. The visual stimuli used the resulting IR pass-through feed so 
that participants would see their own hand, as opposed to a rigged 3D model 
(cf. supplemental figure 1). Finally, the Unity game engine (Unity 
Technologies, San Francisco, CA, USA Version 5.1.3f) was used to render 
the stimuli in an otherwise empty virtual space.  
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Figure 1 – A. Participants are seated at a desk with their right arm resting on a pillow at 
their side. They wear the Head-Mounted Display with attached IR camera. The video feed 
of the camera is used to display the image of the participant’s own hand in the HMD. B. The 
biological and augmented limbs are aligned so that participants see their own hand in the 
correct anatomical position. In the control condition the feedback accurately presents the 
experimenter’s hand and the paintbrush providing synchronous (matching) visuotactile 
feedback. C. In the experimental condition, a 400ms delay is introduced in the visual 
feedback. Participants therefore feel the touch of the paintbrush (light grey) before seeing 
the paintbrush in the corresponding position.  
2.2. Synchronous and Asynchronous Feedback 
In order to change the delay of the visual feedback between the synchronous 
and asynchronous conditions, a buffer of the IR-feed was implemented using 
Leap’s Controller object within Unity. This maintains a frame history buffer 
of 60 frames. At 120fps sampling of the LeapMotion cameras, this provides 
up to half a second delay. Here, a 40-frame delay was used in order to 
produce a ~400ms delay during asynchronous feedback. This includes the 
intrinsic latency of the equipment which is as follows: tracking camera frame 
rate (120fps, ~8ms), tracking algorithm (4ms), display refresh rate (60Hz, 
~17ms), and GPU calculations (~17ms) totalling to an intrinsic system delay 
of ~46ms (Bernal et al., 2016). Feedback in the synchronous condition was 
therefore achieved in under 50ms. The (intrinsic) delay in the synchronous 
feedback condition was therefore well below the temporal mismatch 
threshold shown to interfere with visuotactile integration (300ms, Shimada 
et al., 2009), whereas it was well above this threshold in the asynchronous 
condition.  
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2.3. Tactile Feedback 
Tactile feedback was provided using an ordinary flat, short-haired paint 
brush (size 10). The experimenter stroked the dorsum of the participant’s 
hand and fingers in different positions and directions for a total of three 
minutes. Unlike in previous limb ownership studies, only the participant’s 
hand was stroked, as opposed to an additional rubber hand. Accordingly, the 
visuo-tactile conflict in the asynchronous condition is purely temporal, and 
the visuo-tactile feedback in the synchronous condition exactly matches the 
actual stimulation. It should be noted that the experimental condition of the 
RHI, synchronous feedback, is in this case the control condition, Figure 1B; 
the asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, the control condition in the RHI, 
becomes the experimental condition, Figure 1C.  
In studies 2 and 3, but not study 1, the three-minute illusion was preceded by 
one minute of synchronous, visual only, feedback. Here, participants were 
asked to move their hands in order to familiarise themselves with the 
environment, get accustomed to the feedback, and appreciate that they have 
full control of their own arm in the VR space.  
2.4. ReHI Questionnaire 
Following each experimental block, participants were asked to write down 
any comments they had about their perception of the illusion (open 
feedback). Phenomenological aspects of the illusion were then 
systematically assessed with a questionnaire adapted from the classical RHI 
questionnaire (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008) using a 
banded visual analogue scale (Matejka et al., 2016). Questions one through 
six were scored positively from 0 to 10, whereas questions seven through ten 
pertain to the feeling of disownership and were therefore reverse-coded for 
the analysis (0 -> 10, 1 ->9, etc.). This was done so that all ten questions 
were combined to calculate an overall illusion-score with a possible range of 
0 to 100. A score of 100 represents the highest possible ‘embodiment score’, 
whereas a score of 0 would reflect a complete loss of ownership and agency 
of the seen hand. 
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2.5. Participants 
Study 1 (N=20, age µ=21±1years, 12 female) investigated the illusion based 
on the individual questions and an overall score (see figure 2 for boxplots). 
A t-test comparing the illusion score between the two conditions of interest 
(i.e., synchronous versus asynchronous stroking) revealed a significant effect 
(t(19)=4.58, p<0.001, Cohen’s dz = 1.02) between conditions. This Cohen’s 
d was used for power calculations in studies 2 and 3. Participants for all 
three studies were right-handed (self-reported) and had normal or corrected 
to normal vision. 
A power calculation (G*Power (Faul et al., 2007)) indicated that a sample 
size of 15 would be required to detect an effect size of dz = 1.02, with the 
alpha level set at .05, with power of .95 (two-tailed). Twenty participants 
were recruited for study 2 (age: µ=21.55±2.48years, 10 females).  
Power calculation for the exploratory neurostimulation study was further 
informed by Kammers and colleagues effect size of approximately d = 0.6, 
reported in their rTMS study on the RHI (Kammers et al., 2010). Using a 
paired samples t-test to contrast two stimulation conditions, to reach 80% 
power with this effect size (alpha level = .05) would require 24 participants. 
Twenty-six participants (age µ=21.32±8.31years, 16 male) were recruited 
and completed the tDCS paradigm (study 3).  All participants refrained from 
consuming caffeine for at least three hours prior to the tDCS stimulation. All 
studies had been approved by the University of Central Lancashire’s Ethical 
committee (Protocol PSYSOC336).  
2.6. Transcranial direct current stimulation 
TDCS over the right superior parietal lobule (SPL) was used to change 
cortical excitability (see Figure 3). In one condition, anodal stimulation was 
applied over the right SPL with the aim of increasing cortical excitability, 
with the cathodal electrode as the reference. In another condition, cathodal 
stimulation was applied over the right SPL with the aim of decreasing 
cortical excitability. The third condition was the sham stimulation condition, 
which acted as a baseline against which to compare active stimulation. 
Participants attended two separate sessions, separated by at least three days. 
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Participants always completed the anodal and cathodal stimulation 
conditions in separate sessions, to avoid after-effects from one condition 
affecting another condition. Half the participants additionally completed the 
sham condition at the start of the first session, while the remaining half 
completed the sham condition at the start of the second session. The 
stimulation was applied double-blinded using pre-determined codes stored 
on the tDCS equipment, which determined the type of stimulation applied 
(anodal, cathodal or sham) without the experimenter’s knowledge. 
The electrodes were positioned with the aid of an EASYCAP 21 EEG cap 
(EASYCAP, Herrsching), with the scalp electrode positioned over the P4 
region according to the international 10-20 system. The P4 electrode is 
located approximately over the right superior parietal lobe (Herwig et al., 
2003) and has previously been used to target this region (Lira et al., 2018; 
Ono et al., 2016). The reference electrode was positioned over the ipsilateral 
shoulder, held in place with a rubber strap (cf. Figure 3).  
In the two tDCS conditions, participants received 1200s (including 8s of 
fade-in and 8s of fade-out) of tDCS, using a NeuroConn DC-Stimulator Plus 
(NeuroConn, Germany). A 1.5mA current was delivered through 25cm
2
 
saline-soaked sponges (0.9% NaCl solution), held in place on the 
participant’s scalp by rubber straps (current density of 0.06mA/cm2). 
Stimulation was applied for 600s before task onset, and continued 600s after 
task onset.   
Sham stimulation consisted of stimulation applied for 38s, before dropping 
to regular pulses of 115µA (lasting 3ms) every 550ms, which gives an 
average current strength of 0.002mA. This level of stimulation is far lower 
than required to cause changes in cortical excitability but allows monitoring 
of impedance (which could indicate poor electrode contact or 
disconnection). 
 
2.7. Analysis and Data Availability 
Paired frequentist and Bayesian t-tests were conducted in JASP (JASP 
Team, 2018). These tests were two-tailed for NHST and directional for 
calculation of BF due to clear directional hypothesis of the illusion effect. 
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Significance thresholds were set to p<.05 and BF>3 (BF<.3) respectively. 
NHST was used in combination with power-calculations; Bayesian statistics 
(Dienes, 2014) are included as potential evidence in favour of the null. 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated in R using R-Studio (R Development Core 
Team, 2017) and the Psych package (Revelle, 2017). All data are available 
to the readers via a public Open Science Framework project 
(http://osf.io/wbp59). 
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Figure 2 – Questions and box plot with interquartile ranges of the results across the three studies (C-Control, I-
Illusion) – Questions 1 through 6 were adapted from previous studies on the RHI. Question 4 is a control question and 
question 5 addresses participants’ sense of agency. Questions 7 through 10 were included to directly address 
disownership aspects of the ReHI. Participants in all three cohorts rated embodiment higher given synchronous 
visuotactile feedback about their upper limb in the control condition compared to the asynchronous feedback during 
the ReHI.  All asterisks indicate NHST significance. Data for S2 and S3 (sham stimulation) are taken from left hand.  
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3. RESULTS 
As this is a novel experimental setup, we first set out to investigate the 
effects of the Real Hand Illusion on the phenomenology of the bodily self, 
focusing on hand ownership (Q1), location of touch (Q2-3), agency (Q5), 
and aspects of disownership (Q7-Q10). To compare the overall illusion 
across conditions, a combined score was created based on all questions; for 
this, disownership questions were reverse-coded, leading to a possible range 
of scores from 0 to 100. 
3.1. Study 1 – Limb Disownership 
In study 1, twenty participants completed the synchronous and asynchronous 
feedback conditions and the ten-item questionnaire. Individual questions and 
results across all 3 studies are illustrated in Figure 2. As hypothesised, 
participants rated the questions significantly more positively in the control 
condition (77.53±13.08) than during the illusion (58.47±17.27, p<.001, 
BF=292.66) designed to induce a loss of ownership. 
To highlight a few key questions: participants rated the seen hand to feel less 
like their own during the illusion (Q1 control: 7.58±3.21 to illusion: 
4.46±3.21 (µ±σ), p=.002, BF=36.50); similarly, they reported that it felt less 
likely that the stroking they felt on their hand was due to the stroking on the 
seen hand (Q2: 7.06±3.44 to 4.16±3.46, p=.009, BF=10.96), and less likely 
that it was stroked in the same location (Q3: 8.87±1.47 to 3.85±3.51, p<.001, 
BF=2425.24). Participants also reported an effect of the ReHI on their 
(hypothetical) ability to move the seen hand (“feeling of agency” Q5: 
8.81±2.11 to 7.16±3.37, p=.021, BF=5.41). With respect to the disownership 
questions, participants reported that their hands felt less vivid than normal 
during the illusion (Q10: 6.83±2.88 to 5.15±2.95, p=.016, BF=6.89). 
Questions Q7-9 were not rated significantly differently between conditions 
in study 1 but may be worth further investigating as indicated by the 
inconclusive BF (all p>.085, all BF inconclusive .45<BF<.1.75).  
3.2. Study 2 – Lateralisation 
In study 2, the lateralization of body representation and its malleability were 
investigated. It was hypothesised that the strength of the illusion would be 
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higher for participants’ left hand compared to their right. A 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA, based on the overall illusion strength, confirmed our 
data from study 1 with respect to the main effect of the illusion. The total 
score significantly dropped from 83.95±13.10 during synchronous feedback 
to 66.36±20.06 during the asynchronous feedback of the illusion (main 
effect of illusion F(1,19)=16.04, p<.001, η2=.46). There was no overall effect 
of laterality (p=.107); however, there was a significant interaction between 
the two factors (F(1,19)=5.84, p=.026, η2=.24): Questionnaire scores were 
lower for the left than the right hand during the illusion but not in the control 
condition. As hypothesised, the illusion was stronger for the left hand (paired 
t-test: µ-difference: 6.41±2.69, t(19)=2.38, p=.028) . The ANOVA results 
were corroborated in Bayesian t-tests. The data strongly support a main 
effect of illusion (C>I: BF=92.98) but not of lateralization (R≠L, BF=.78). 
The interaction, indicated by the left-right differences in both conditions, 
was also supported by the data (RI-LI > RC-LC: BF=4.61), resulting from 
the lateralisation difference during the illusion (LI < RI: BF=4.43). 
3.3. Study 3 – Neurostimulation 
In study 3, we set out to investigate the involvement of right parietal 
networks in maintaining body representation during the Real Hand Illusion. 
In two separate sessions, participants completed the ReHI while receiving 
sham, anodal, or cathodal tDCS stimulation, with the scalp electrode placed 
over the right superior parietal lobe. As this was an exploratory study, we 
were mainly interested in the overall effect of stimulation on ReHI score and 
the main contrast of anodal versus cathodal stimulation. In order to 
normalise the data, we therefore subtracted the average ReHI score during 
sham stimulation from anodal and cathodal scores. This resulted in a 2 x 2 
repeated measures design with factors Illusion (synchronous, asynchronous) 
and Stimulation (anodal, cathodal). In-line with the studies 1 and 2, we 
report a significant main effect of the illusion in a third, independent 
participant pool (F(1,25)=25.54, p<.001, η2=.51, BFC>I=1474.21). We 
additionally observed a main effect of Stimulation with ReHI scores being 
higher during cathodal stimulation than during anodal stimulation 
(F(1,25)=5.35, p=.029, η2=.18, BFC>A=3.81, BFC≠A=1.94, see Figure 3b), 
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although there was no interaction between illusion condition and stimulation 
condition (F(1, 25) = 0.02, p = .89). 
3.4. Questionnaire Reliability 
As this is a novel paradigm accompanied by a newly designed questionnaire, 
we ran a reliability analysis across the three data sets (N=66) – once for the 
control condition, and once for the illusion condition. Cronbach’s alpha for 
the questionnaire responses in the control condition was αcontrol=0.79, in the 
illusion αillusion=0.85, indicating good internal consistency across the three 
cohorts.   
 
 
 
Figure 3 Effects of Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation on ReHI Strength. A Electrodes were 
placed on the P4 position based of the international 10-20 system and the right shoulder. B The main 
contrast indicates that anodal stimulation over P4 significantly decreased embodiment across both 
conditions compared to cathodal stimulation. (Sham scores were subtracted for baseline correction.) 
C Breakdown of questionnaire scores across control and ReHI conditions and stimulation type. All 
boxplots indicate medians and Interquartile ranges; means are indicated by solid circles or diamonds 
(CC/CI = Cathodal Control/Illusion; SC/SI = Sham Control/Illusion; AC/AI = Anodal 
Control/Illusion). 
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4. DISCUSSION  
We here introduce a body-illusion that directly reduces the feeling of 
ownership over one’s biological limb without relying on feedback from a 
supernumerary proxy such as a rubber hand. Participants view their own 
arm, in Mixed Reality, from an embodied, first person perspective but 
receive feedback that contains a temporal, visuotactile conflict. In a series of 
three studies, in three separate participant pools, we demonstrate that the 
asynchronous feedback in the Real Hand Illusion causes participants to rate 
ownership (and the sense of agency) over their own hand and related 
sensations significantly lower than in the synchronous control condition. In 
addition, a number of participants independently reported a phenomenon 
akin to “pins and needles”, the tickling sensation that often occurs after 
transient paraesthesia.  
The Real Hand Illusion, which could be considered as an inverse of the 
classical rubber hand illusion, hence modulates body ownership by 
introducing a controlled mismatch into bottom-up multisensory integration. 
Our data suggest that this weakened embodiment is pronounced for the left 
hand, supporting the right hemispheric dominance hypothesis of body 
representation as reflected in neuropsychological case reports and previous 
ownership illusion studies in healthy participants. Transcranial direct current 
stimulation over the right superior lobule modulated the overall strength of 
limb ownership, corroborating the role of right posterior parietal networks 
for multisensory representations of the body and self.    
4.1. Phenomenology 
Embodiment, ownership, and the sense of agency have been argued to be 
matters of “a very thin phenomenal awareness” (Gallagher, 2007) and to 
only form the “background of mental life” (Longo et al., 2008). Often, we 
only fully become aware of these processes when they break down – which 
can have severe consequences (see e.g. Ananthaswamy, 2016; Sacks, 1998). 
While research into the sense of agency has managed to address this by 
experimentally modulating a loss of control (Franck et al., 2001; Kannape 
and Blanke, 2013; Leube et al., 2003a, 2003b; Nielsen, 1963; Wegner, 
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2002), a symptom that is often evident in clinical conditions (see e.g. 
Blakemore et al., 2002), ownership studies have instead investigated the 
opposite: a ‘positive’ ownership of an artificial limb such as a rubber hand 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) or rubber foot (Lenggenhager et al., 2015), 
someone else’s filmed arm (Hohwy and Paton, 2010) or even two versions 
of one’s own hand (Ratcliffe and Newport, 2017) in-line with the E+ but not 
E- patients described in the introduction (Garbarini et al., 2015). Analog to 
sensorimotor studies delineating the spatiotemporal limits of agency, we 
have here introduced a paradigm to directly induce disownership of one’s 
own limb: where participants report a loss of control over their actions in 
agency research, participants in the ReHI perceive a significantly weakened 
ownership over their own hand and arm, along with the spontaneously 
reported sensation of pins and needles.  
The topic of disownership is a somewhat contentious area with respect to the 
RHI. There is a general consensus that the rubber hand is embodied during 
synchronous feedback (see e.g. Serino et al., 2013) – arguably only into the 
body image (for perception) but not the body schema (for action) (Kammers 
et al., 2009). However, this does not automatically imply that one’s own 
limb is simultaneously disembodied. While arguments have been made for 
some disownership and deafferentation, either by asking directly about 
disownership of the real hand (Preston, 2013) or by inferring from 
physiological data (drop in skin temperature (Moseley et al., 2008; Salomon 
et al., 2013) or alterations in immune response (Barnsley et al., 2011), but 
see (de Haan et al., 2017) for a critical account), evidence suggests that 
multiple representations of the hand might co-exist (Ehrsson, 2009; 
McGonigle et al., 2002) severely limiting the argument made in previous 
RHI-type studies. This also corresponds to the results and interpretation of 
Lane and colleagues (2017) who specifically targeted limb disownership 
during the RHI: disownership for the biological limb is less robust than 
ownership for the rubber hand, as attention is primarily directed at the latter. 
Ultimately, the strongest statement to be made in favour of disembodiment 
from these previous paradigms is that the supernumerary hand replaces or 
“functionally suppresses” the participant’s actual hand (Longo et al., 2008).  
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Another important argument raised by Longo and colleagues in their 
psychometric approach to the RHI is that the asynchronous condition cannot 
be reduced to a mere control condition. Sensations grouped under the 
umbrella term “deafference”, only occur in the asynchronous condition (and 
still rely on a weak embodiment of the rubber hand). The ReHI illusion 
targets exactly these aspects of body disownership but based on the (strongly 
embodied) biological limb of the participant. Sensations such as “numbness” 
and “pins and needles”, included as direct questions in both conditions in 
Longo et al., were spontaneously reported by the participants in all three 
cohorts of the ReHI – and only in the asynchronous and in this case illusion 
condition. Further, the feeling of disownership and deafferentation are both 
enhanced during asynchronous stroking.  
In summary, the phenomenology of the ReHI extends previous findings as it 
precludes both supernumerary embodiment and the replacement of the actual 
limb representation. There is only one arm. Rather than being indicative of a 
malleability to multisensory body illusions or an ability to incorporate 
supernumerary limbs, the current findings hence suggest that limb 
representation can directly be attenuated and phenomenologically 
deafferented, without “tricking the brain” by including a proxy. It is 
therefore not so much illustrating the malleability of limb representation but 
questions its actual permanence: contradicting William James famous 
premise (James, 1890), the body may not always be there. 
4.2. Handedness and Lateralisation  
Study 2 illustrates that the phenomenological experience of the ReHI was 
stronger for the left hand as opposed to the right. This difference in 
lateralisation was specific to the illusion condition as no lateralisation was 
observed in the control condition. The findings are in line with mounting 
evidence that Xenomelia, similar to Somatoparaphrenia, more often than not 
affects the left side of the body (Brugger and Lenggenhager, 2014; McGeoch 
et al., 2011). While an argument is to be made that lateralisation may be a 
result of handedness, and stronger bodily illusions have been reported for the 
non-dominant hand (Brugger and Meier, 2015), evidence from the RHI 
suggests there is a right-hemispheric dominance for sense of body ownership 
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independent of handedness ((Ocklenburg et al., 2011), but also see (Smit et 
al., 2017)). Taken together, this suggests that the ReHI is mediated by 
multisensory bodily areas in right-hemispheric posterior parietal areas (Hilti 
et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 2011; Rode et al., 1992), further motivating the 
exploratory neurostimulation study to focus on the left upper-limb.  
4.3. Neurostimulation modulates Limb Disownership  
The results from Study 3 indicated that application of tDCS over the right 
SPL modulated the experience of ownership, dependent on the polarity of 
stimulation. Specifically, anodal stimulation led to reduced feelings of 
ownership over the limb, while cathodal stimulation increased feelings of 
ownership. It should be noted that this was an exploratory study, aiming to 
link the ReHI to activity in the parietal cortex; future studies should 
therefore aim to test under which conditions the effect of stimulation holds. 
Our data suggest that transcranial stimulation affected the experience of 
ownership during both the illusion and control conditions, suggestive of a 
broad effect of stimulation that is not dependent on synchronous visuotactile 
feedback. This is in line with two recent neurostimulation studies reporting 
mainly non-illusion-specific effects of anodal stimulation over right PPC ( 
Convento et al., 2018; Lira et al., 2018).  
An open question remains as to the exact mechanisms affected by 
neurostimulation. Convento and colleagues (2018) report the strongest effect 
of stimulation on the drift measure rather than the subjective strength of the 
illusion, whereas Lira and colleagues (2018) report a stimulation-dependent 
change in illusion-onset times. In the latter study, the authors argue that the 
observed differences may be due to generally enhanced multisensory 
processing; in the former, the authors further discuss the involvement of 
body-specific sensory integration (see also (Tsakiris et al., 2008)). What both 
of these previous studies have in common, however, is that anodal 
stimulation of the parietal lobe led to increased efficacy of the illusion (i.e. 
faster time to illusion onset, or proprioceptive drift) – that is, participants 
perceived more ownership over the rubber hand – whereas, in the present 
study, a similar stimulation paradigm resulted in participants perceiving less 
ownership over their own arm. Although these results may seem somewhat 
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contradictory, they can be reconciled, if we assume the effect of stimulation 
in both the RHI and ReHI is relevant to inducing disownership over one’s 
own limb. The underlying mechanism of this effect could on the one hand 
relate to a localized change in multisensory processing (Lira et al., 2018), 
body-specific integration (Convento et al., 2018; Tsakiris et al., 2008), or a 
re-weighting of sensory information over body-representation in the parietal 
lobe, or on the other hand a change in functionally connected regions such as 
the primary or secondary somatosensory cortex (Hänggi et al., 2017), where 
structural and functional hyper-connectivity have been reported in 
individuals with Xenomelia. This explanation is necessarily speculative but 
could further be investigated using neuroimaging alongside the ReHI 
paradigm.  
From a clinical perspective, it is further of interest that previous studies have 
shown that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied to the right 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) disrupts the rubber hand illusion for body-
like objects (but not other objects, cf. Tsakiris et al., 2008). Clinically, low-
frequency repetitive TMS applied to the TPJ may decrease the frequency of 
auditory hallucinations in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, a 
symptom frequently linked to loss of agency or ownership over self-
generated speech (Moseley et al., 2013; Slotema et al., 2014). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that non-invasive neurostimulation is 
capable of affecting the perception of bodily ownership and support the 
therapeutic potential of neurostimulation in disorders of bodily ownership. 
4.4. ReHI Considerations 
In contrast to the on-going, artificially synchronised visuotactile feedback 
required by the RHI, the ReHI relies on exploiting the same bottom-up 
multisensory integration processes by introducing a temporal mismatch to 
disrupt body ownership. In addition to the aforementioned conceptual 
advantages, this has a number of practical advantages. One, the sensation of 
the mismatch is immediate. Unlike the RHI, which relies on continued 
synchronous feedback from two distinct, visuotactile sources and has 
reported onset times between 10-50 seconds (Ehrsson, 2004; Kalckert and 
Ehrsson, 2017) the ReHI relies on a hard-coded temporal mismatch from a 
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single source. Two, the multisensory mismatch is unresolvable, making the 
illusion very stable. Participants feel the touch on the back of their hand 
before receiving visual feedback. As the position of the subsequent touch-
location is unpredictable, there cannot be an adaptation to the conflicting 
sensory information. Three, the mismatch is purely temporal. Whereas 
inadvertent spatiotemporal incongruencies occur in both synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions in the RHI (and to a lesser extent in Gentile et al., 
2013), only a single hand is stimulated in the ReHI. Four, and continuing 
this point, the control condition is very accurate, as the perceived location of 
the touch exactly corresponds to the seen location. The technical setup 
precludes an unwanted (spatial) mismatch, apart from the intrinsic 
(temporal) delay.  
While previous (Mixed Reality) studies mainly used RHI-type setups 
(IJsselsteijn et al., 2006; Shimada et al., 2009) and thus still relied on an 
albeit virtual proxy, some have used similar visual feedback based on the 
participant’s own body (Suzuki et al., 2013), or overlapped feedback from a 
virtual or someone else’s real hand over the participant’s hand (Hohwy and 
Paton, 2010; Yuan and Steed, 2010). However, these studies only matched 
individual aspects of the current setup but differed with respect to at least 
one of the four constraints for the (body-) integration of multisensory signals 
described by Blanke and colleagues (2015): correct proprioceptive (1) and  
body-related visual information (2), adherence to peripersonal space (3), and 
continued congruence of multisensory feedback (4). Our setup further 
extends the setup used by Gentile and colleagues (2013) as it allows for real-
time manipulation.  Finally, the setup is portable and easily implemented, 
making it a promising tool for clinical studies and potential outpatient 
treatment. The paradigm relies on a simple (video) buffer, making it 
adaptable to a range of mobile devices and commercially available research 
platforms. 
4.5. Limitations and Future Directions 
There are still a number of open questions to address. For example, we based 
our questionnaire on widely used RHI items but included four new questions 
directly addressing limb disownership (Q7-10), extending the questionnaire 
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used in (Gentile et al., 2013). A follow-up study that investigates an 
expanded questionnaire using principal component analysis, similar to the 
approach taken by Longo and colleagues (Longo et al., 2008) may be able to 
improve the reporting of the phenomenology of the ReHI. Linking back to 
the “pins and needles” sensation spontaneously reported by participants, 
physiological reactions to the illusion should be investigated. Gentile and 
colleagues (2013) have illustrated changes in galvanic skin conductance 
depending on the disembodiment of the shown hand. Further studies may 
follow previous protocols on the RHI to investigate body temperature 
(Macauda et al., 2015; Moseley et al., 2008), nociception (Hansel et al., 
2011; Romano et al., 2014), cardiac signalling (Park et al., 2016), and 
immunological responses (Barnsley et al., 2011)) up to high-level cognition 
(Maister et al., 2015).  
A further line of inquiry should address the clinical aspects of limb 
disownership by working with patient populations. For example, individuals 
with Xenomelia show an enhanced response for the affected limb in a rubber 
hand illusion type of setup (Lenggenhager et al., 2015). Does the same hold 
true for the ReHI and how does its phenomenology compare to the sensation 
of “over-completeness” described by these individuals? Does it capture 
aspects of loss of limb ownership experienced in Somatoparaphrenia 
analogous to the RHI in E+ patients (Garbarini et al., 2015)? Applying the 
ReHI in individuals with Xenomelia may recreate the reported feeling of 
disownership – or, by inducing disownership over an unwanted limb – create 
a cessation in the dysphoric feeling of over-completeness. Similar to the 
pretending behaviour exercised by these individuals (First, 2005; L. Fischer, 
2015), this may offer a temporary relief, if not a treatment. Research with 
such a cohort will further be relevant to understanding the permanence of 
body representation. If the loss of ownership is a gradual process, it could 
potentially be tracked longitudinally using the ReHI and further related to 
the frequency and duration of pretend behaviour over time. The exploratory 
tDCS results further merit investigation of neurostimulation as a therapeutic 
possibility (although this may evoke ethical questions pertaining to the 
identity of individuals with Xenomelia). Finally, applying an analogue 
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paradigm to the full body (Blanke et al., 2015) may provide an experimental 
link to investigating aspects of depersonalisation in the general population 
(Sierra and David, 2011). 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Real Hand Illusion introduced here offers a direct way of modulating 
limb ownership in healthy individuals. It does so without relying on a proxy, 
but by introducing a temporal, visuotactile mismatch into bottom-up 
processed feedback about one’s own limb in Mixed Reality. These findings 
are corroborated by two additional studies in independent participant pools 
linking the illusion to right posterior parietal networks for multisensory 
representations of the body and self. By directly investigating the loss of 
ownership of one’s own limb, analogue to research into the sense of agency, 
the Real Hand Illusion opens up the possibility of more adequately 
addressing the majority of clinical cases of altered body ownership; further, 
it provides a novel method of investigating body representation and its 
permanence in healthy individuals. 
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Highlights 
 Mixed Reality Illusion induces sense of disownership of biological limb. 
 Illusory Disownership is stronger for left limb, in-line with 
neuropsychological cases. 
 Limb-ownership is modulated by transcranial stimulation of right parietal 
network. 
 Results support lateralized right-parietal body network. 
 Participants spontaneously report perceiving a “pins and needles” 
sensation. 
 
